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Pylons ablaze: Examining the role of 5GCOVID-19
conspiracy beliefs and support for violence
Daniel Jolley and Jenny L. Paterson
Northumbria University, UK
Amid increased acts of violence against telecommunication engineers and property, this
pre-registered study (N = 601Britons) investigated the association between beliefs in 5G
COVID-19 conspiracy theories and the justification and willingness to use violence.
Findings revealed that belief in 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theories was positively
correlated with state anger, which in turn, was associated with a greater justification of
real-life and hypothetical violence in response to an alleged link between 5G mobile
technology and COVID-19, alongside a greater intent to engage in similar behaviours in
the future. Moreover, these associations were strongest for those highest in paranoia.
Furthermore, we show that these patterns are not specific to 5G conspiratorial beliefs:
General conspiracy mentality was positively associated with justification and willingness
for general violence, an effect mediated by heightened state anger, especially for those
most paranoid in the case of justification of violence. Such research provides novel
evidence on why and when conspiracy beliefs may justify the use of violence.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, telecommunication masts across Europe, North
America, and Australasia have been damaged or destroyed in arson attacks, while
engineers have been subjected to verbal and physical abuse (Ankel, 2020; Cerulus, 2020;
Pasley, 2020). Such violence not only seems unwarranted, attacking essential workers
along with vital infrastructure, particularly during a global pandemic, is extremely
irresponsible and dangerous (e.g., Cowburn, 2020). Why, then, have some individuals
resorted to these senseless attacks? According to police officials andmedia commentators,
the perpetrators are likely to be motivated by the erroneous conspiratorial belief that
electromagnetic waves transmitted by 5G technology have somehow caused COVID-19
and so respondwith violent actions to stop,what they see, as the origin of COVID-19 (e.g.,
Waterson & Hern, 2020). By empirically testing this assumption, the current research
provides a timely and important investigation into the associations between conspiracy
beliefs and violence to explorewhy andwhen conspiracy beliefsmay justify – and ignite –
violence.
Conspiracy theories explain the ultimate causes of significant events as the secret
actions of malevolent groups, who cover-up information to suit their interests (e.g.,
Douglas, et al., 2017). These beliefs tend to emerge in times of crisis in society (van
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Prooijen & Douglas, 2017), where people are seeking to make sense of a chaotic world
(e.g., Franks, et al., 2017 ).With its ensuing worldwide chaos, COVID-19 typifies themost
fertile ground for conspiracy theories to bloom (see Van Bavel et al., 2020). Disconcert-
ingly, the consequences of such conspiracy theories are significant andwide-ranging (e.g.,
increase in prejudice and everyday crime; see Jolley, et al., 2020) and may be linked to
violent intentions. Uscinski and Parent (2014), for example, found that people high in
conspiracy thinkingweremore supportive of political violence,while Imhoff et al. (2020)
found that when people took the perspective that society is governed by conspiracies,
they were more supportive of violent extremism. To date, however, the mechanisms
linking conspiracy beliefs and violent intent have yet to be explored.
One possible mechanism between conspiracy beliefs and violent intent is likely to be
anger. Anger is usually elicited when individuals perceive an entity is intentionally
threatening or inflicting harm to the self or ingroup (Giner-Sorolla, & Russell, 2019). As
conspiracy theories depict ‘conspirators’ as hostile actors who seek to cause such
intentional harm (e.g., van Prooijen&Douglas 2017), it is likely that conspiracy beliefswill
evoke anger. In support of this assertion, conspiracy narratives have been shown to
promote hostility in individuals (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Marchlewska, et al.,
2019), a construct related to anger (Rubio-Garay, et al., 2016). Importantly, as anger can
inspire people to redress perceived wrongdoings or injustices (Carver & Harmon-Jones,
2009; Fischer & Roseman, 2007), often by motivating people to act to confront, hit, or
attack the anger-evoking target (Berkowitz, 1993; Mackie, et al., 2000; Roseman, et al.,
1994), this anger is likely to provoke violence (Coid et al., 2013a; Reagu, et al., 2013;
Ullrich et al., 2014). It is plausible, therefore, that conspiracy beliefs may increase feelings
of anger which, in turn, could be associated with the increased support of violence. That
is, subscribing to the viewpoint that powerful hostileothers are conspiring (e.g., about the
link between 5G andCOVID-19) is likely to increase angerwhich, in turn, evokes violence
towards a specific target (e.g., telecommunications masts and engineers).
While anger is a likely mediator between conspiracy beliefs and violent intent, it is
clear that anger does not always provoke violence. Indeed, anger promotes a range of
behaviours including non-violent responses (Halperin, 2008) and evenpositive, pro-social
responses (Van Doorn, et al., 2014). So, key to understanding – and tackling – violent
responses to conspiracy beliefs is uncoveringwhen conspiratorially evoked anger is most
likely to trigger violence. One pertinent factor could be paranoia. As a distinct but closely
correlated construct of conspiracy beliefs, paranoia refers to the belief that awide range of
external agents harbours hostile intent towards them personally – as opposed to the
conspiratorial belief that powerful organizations are harming society at large (Imhoff &
Lamberty, 2018). Such self-referential paranoia, along with anger, has been identified as a
significant predictor of violence in forensic psychological research (e.g., Doyle & Dolan,
2006). Notably, when investigating the link between paranoia and violence in a clinical
sample, Coid et al. (2013b) found that violence was a more likely outcome when
individuals experienced paranoia and were angry, thus suggesting a moderating effect
between the two variables (see also Ullrich et al., 2014). Extrapolating from this clinical
sample, then, suggests that conspiratorially provoked anger is most likely to be associated
with violence for those reporting more paranoia.
The present research
Previous research has demonstrated that conspiracy theories may be linked with violent
intentions (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). To date, however, we do not understand why
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conspiracy theorizing may be linked with violence, andwhen such a relationship may be
more pronounced. The current research sought to address these gaps. Specifically, in a
British sample, we hypothesize that 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs will be
positively associated with the justification and willingness of real-life violence, hypothet-
ical violence, and the intention to be violent in response to the alleged link between 5G
and COVID-19 (H1), which will be mediated by higher levels of state anger (H2). We also
posit that moderated-mediational analyses will reveal that the associations between anger
and violent responses within the mediational model will be strongest for those highest in
self-reported paranoia (H3). Finally, highlighting the generalizability of the research, we
hypothesize that general conspiracy theorizing will be linked to general measures of
violence, an effect explained by state anger (H4), which is similarly conditional on high
levels of paranoia (H5). Figure 1 presents the hypothesized moderated mediations.
Method
Participants
All analyseswere pre-registered.1 The sample sizewas calculated using the linearmultiple
regression option in G*Power specifying three predictors and their product terms to
examine conditional (moderated) effects at 80%power to find a small effect (.02),which is
recommended to be a good first estimate in psychological research (Brysbaert, 2019). The
recommended minimum sample was 550. We recruited 601 participants (436 females,
162 males, 2 trans, 1 non-binary; Mage = 34.34, SD = 12.09; all UK residents) via the
online participant database, Prolific, on 10 April 2020. Participants received a small
participation fee. Education levels varied: 0.8% had no formal qualifications, 11% had
GCSEs (or equivalent), 31.1%hadA-levels/BTEC, 40.4%had a degree, 13.8%had aMasters,
and 2.8% had a PhD. One hundred and eighty-three (30.4%) had, or knew someone who
had, contracted COVID-19.
Materials and procedure
Unless otherwise stated, items were measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree) scale and were counterbalanced.2
Conspiracy beliefs
State anger
Paranoia
Violence
Figure 1. A path diagram to present the hypothesized moderated mediations with conspiracy beliefs
(either 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs or conspiracy mentality) as predictors, state anger as mediator,
and measures of justification and willingness for violence as criteria, with the b-path moderated by
paranoia.
1 Pre-registration: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=aq8qn7
2 The study also assessed vulnerable narcissism as a proposedmoderator, and compliance to confinement as an outcome for pre-
registered secondary analyses which are presented in the supplementary materials.
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General conspiracy mentality was measured using five items (e.g., ‘I think that events
which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities’,
a = .83, Bruder et al., 2013). Belief in 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theories was measured
with five items (e.g., ‘The real truth about the link between COVID-19 and 5G is being
kept from the public’, a = 97, adapted from Wood, 2017). Participants then completed
the State Anger Scale (Spielberger & London, 1982), indicating how they felt at the
moment using 15 items (e.g., ‘I am mad’, a = .96, 1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
Next, participants were presented with the following excerpt taken from the BBC but
anonymized for thepurpose of the study: ‘Mobile phonemast fires are being investigated
amid conspiracy theories claiming a link between 5G and coronavirus. There have
been fires at masts in Birmingham, Liverpool and Melling in Merseyside’. They were
then asked ‘Do you believe that the events described in the text are justified’
(1 = unjustified – 7 = justified; justification of real-life violence) and ‘In the future, how
likely is it that you would engage in behaviours described in the text?’(1 = very
unlikely – 7 = very likely; willingness for real-life violence).
Afterwards, participants indicated whether they believed a range of behaviours were
justified in response to the alleged link between 5G mobile technology and COVID-19
using seven items (1 = unjustified – 7 = justified). Cronbach’s alpha was unacceptable
(a = .65) so an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on all items. All statistical
assumptions were met and two factors emerged (50.16% and 23.24% variance explained,
respectively). On inspection, violent items were shown to be the first factor (five items:
e.g., ‘Arson attacks on private property’; a = .87) and the second comprised of non-
violent items (two items: ‘Boycotts of organisations you believe are responsible’;
‘Signing a petition to the authorities’, Spearman–Brown coefficient = .86).
Participantswere also asked how likely that theywould engage in the samebehaviours
(1 = very unlikely) – 7 = very likely, a = .67). Again, an EFA was conducted which met
statistical assumptions and two factors emerged (violent, a = .94 [62.03% of variance];
non-violent, Spearman–Brown coefficient = .87 [23.31% of variance]). As the study’s
hypotheses were formed for violent responses, the non-violent items are reported in the
supplementary materials.
Participants then completed two general measures of violence (Lamberty & Leiser,
2019): general justificationof violence (3 items including, ‘In certain situations, I amquite
willing to use physical violence to assert my interests’ a = .85) and general willingness to
use violence (two items3 ‘In general, I would be willing to use physical violence to fight
others’; ‘I think it’s good if there are people who also use violence to bring back order’,
Spearman–Brown coefficient = .74). Finally, participants completed ameasure of paranoia
(Paranoid Ideation Scale, Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) using twenty items (e.g., ‘Someone
has it in for me’, a = .92), each on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all applicable to me,
7 = extremely applicable to me). Demographic questions then followed.
Results
Data checking and correlations
As some variables exhibited significant skew, non-parametric analyseswere performed on
the data. Table 1 presents the descriptives and Spearman’s rank correlations. In support
of H1, belief in 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theories was significantly and positively
3 The item ‘I would never use physical violence myself’ was removed and improved scale reliability from a = .60 to the
acceptable threshold.
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correlated with all measures assessing justification and willingness for violent responses
to 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Likewise, conspiracy mentality was positively
correlated with all measures. Supporting the proposedmediational patterns (H2 andH4),
state angerwas positively associatedwith the proposed predictors (belief in 5GCOVID-19
conspiracy theories and conspiracymentality), aswell as all the proposed criteria (i.e., the
justification and willingness for violent responses). Correlational analyses also revealed
that participant demographics (age, gender, education level, and experiencewithCOVID-
19) significantly correlated with a variety of measures and so were controlled for in the
subsequent analyses.
Mediation: 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, state anger, and violence
We examined the proposed mediational role of state anger between 5G COVID-19
conspiracy beliefs and violent responses to the alleged link between 5G mobile
technology and COVID-19 (H2). As PROCESS is robust to non-parametric data and
statistical outliers (Demming, Jahn, & Boztug, 2017), PROCESS model 4 with 95% bias-
corrected confidence intervals and 5000 bootstrap samples were used (Hayes, 2013).
Table 2 reveals strong support forH2 showing that state anger was a significant mediator
between all the measured variables. In addition, Table 2 shows that even accounting for
these significant mediational pathways, 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs remained
significantly and directly associated with all the criteria.4
Moderated mediation: 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, state anger, violence, and
paranoia
To examine the hypothesis that the pathways between anger and the justification and
willingness for violent responses in the mediations (i.e., the b-paths) would be strongest
for those highest in self-reported paranoia (H3), we used PROCESS model 14 with 95%
bias-corrected confidence intervals and 5000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2013). In support
ofH3, Table 3 shows significant indices of moderated mediations for the justification and
willingness of both real-life violence and a range of other violent acts in response to the
alleged 5GCOVID-19 link (thoughwillingness for violent responseswasmarginal = .004,
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals = .0001, .01). Examining the conditional
indirect effects at the three levels of the moderator (M and M -/+ 1SD) shows that, as
hypothesized, the association between anger and violence was strongest for those who
reported being more paranoid (though there was a marginal link between anger and the
justification of real-life violence for relatively highly paranoid participants). Similar to the
mediational analyses, 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs again remained a significant direct
and positive predictor of all the criteria even when accounting for the moderation-
mediational associations.
General conspiracy theorizing, state anger, general violence, and paranoia
Similar to the specific 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, the more general measure of
conspiracy mentality was found to be associated with justification and willingness for
4 This pattern was replicated (alongside the moderated mediations) with a measure of general conspiracy theorising (see
Supplementary Materials).
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general violence,mediated by anger, thus supportingH4 (Table 2). In addition, providing
partial support forH5, Table 3 showed a significant index of moderatedmediation for the
justification of general violence variable. Replicating the findings above, this moderated
mediation revealed that those highest in paranoia showed the strongest link between
anger and the justification of general violence. However, there was no moderated-
mediation evident for thewillingness for general violencemeasure. Conspiracymentality,
meanwhile, remained a direct and positive predictor of justification and willingness of
general violence.
Discussion
Police officials and media commentators worldwide have strongly proposed a link
between acts of arson on 5G telecommunication masts and belief in 5G COVID-19
conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Waterson &Hern, 2020). Our findings provide empirical support
for such an assertion: belief in 5G COVID-19 conspiracy theories were positively
associatedwith such violent responses, mediated by state anger, especially for individuals
highest in paranoia. These patterns were also largely replicated when exploring the link
between general conspiracy theorizing and general violence, thus highlighting the
potential generalizability of these associations.
Our findings make several important advances on previous work. Notably, we expand
upon previous literature (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014) by investigating the possible
violent consequences of subscribing to a specific, as well as a general, conspiracy theory
(i.e., 5G COVID-19 beliefs). Further, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that
the affectivemechanisms (e.g., anger) between conspiracy beliefs and violence have been
explored. Thus, our work makes a timely contribution not only to understanding the link
between conspiracy beliefs and real-life violence, but it also highlights the often
overlooked yet important potential interplay between conspiracy theorizing and
emotion.
In addition to identifying why conspiracy theorizing may promote violence, our
findings help identify who is most likely to perpetuate conspiracy-related violence.
Supporting previous research with a clinical sample (Coid et al., 2013b), we present
relatively consistent evidence that individuals who are most paranoid are most likely to
respond violently to conspiratorially evoked anger. These findings are notable because of
their novelty and their possible practical implications. Drawing on the angermanagement
literature (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2003), for example, it is possible that future research
could explore interventions that target and teach paranoid individuals to respond to the
anger they feel in response to conspiracy beliefs in more appropriate ways, thus reducing
the likelihood of violence. This may be a particularly promising first step in combatting
violent reactions considering that conspiracy beliefs are resistant to change (Jolley &
Douglas, 2017), and currently, little is known of the links between conspiracy beliefs and
anger – or how to reduce it. Thus, targeting the link between anger and violence may be a
more effective initial approach.
Future research could also address our limitations. First, experimental and longitudinal
designs would help strengthen our cross-sectional claims. The low means of some of the
more extremequestionsmay also cause concern, however, statistical tests robust to issues
surrounding such skewed, infrequent data, still found consistent, albeit small, effects,
even after controlling for key demographic variables. While the statistical effects may be
small, they are nonetheless important because the impact of conspiracy-inspired violence
5G COVID-19 conspiracy belief and violence 9
could be far-reaching and significant. For example, British government officials warned
that recent arson attacks against phonemasts disrupted emergency services, endangering
lives (Devlin, 2020). Thus, understanding any significant contributing factor, no matter
how small, is important. Relatedly, future research could use more specific operational-
izations of the constructs to identify larger effects, for example, instead of measuring
anger felt in the moment, a more specific measure of anger directed at a particular group
could be more informative. Future research could also explore other mechanisms
between conspiracy theorizing and violence – such as fear and anxiety (Hatfield & Dula,
2014; Roberton, et al., 2012). Furthermore, as conspiracy-related violence has become
more worldwide, our findings both in relation to general conspiracy mentality and
specific 5G COVID-19 beliefs suggest that future research could replicate the effects in
other contexts and with different conspiracy beliefs.
In summary, we provide the first empirical evidence suggesting that belief in 5G
COVID-19 conspiracy theories is associated with violent responses to the alleged link
between 5G mobile technology and COVID-19. This relationship is explained by state
anger, where the effect between anger and violence is strongest for those who have
heightened paranoia. This pattern is replicated for the link between conspiracy mentality
and the justification of violence in general. Our novel findings not only extend previous
research by examining the impact of conspiracy beliefs and violence on a topical issue,
they also uncoverwhy (anger) andwhen (paranoia) conspiracy beliefs may justify the use
of violence. By building upon these findings, future research is well placed to explore
interventions to mitigate the relationships between conspiracy beliefs, anger, and
violence.
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